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Abstract 
Is there not any place in the history of ideas for the imperfect character of human doings (i.e. 
capability of error) that is repeated for so long until we lately start to think that it had long been wrong? The 
answer is: In the conventional histories of ideas there is almost none. The importance of the phenomenon, 
however, is immense. Intellectual history is full of errors. Scholarly errors are among the factors that generate 
intellectual pathways in which consequences of historical small events feed back up on each other positively 
and give rise to historical pathologies in the end. Pathways hold the intellectuals dependent on the 
consequences of errors which interact upon each other and prevent resulting pathologies to disappear fully. 
As a result, ideas do not converge to a level of perfection. Evolutionary account of errors suggests that errors 
in the history of ideas matter even though they are often corrected. 
Keywords: Errors in the history of ideas, intellectual path dependence, intellectual pathologies, the 
Coase Theorem, historical small events. 
 
Entelektüel Patikaya Bağımlılığa Yol Açan Sebeplerden Biri Üzerine 
Düşünceler  
Özet 
Düşünceler tarihinde insan ediminin mükemmel olmayan karakterine (yani, hata yapma kabiliyetine) 
ne kadar yer ayrılmıştır? Konvansiyonel düşünce tarihi yazımı içinde hemen hemen hiç. Oysa entellektüel 
tarih bu tür hatalarla doludur ve bu hatalar entelektüel patikaya bağımlılığın en büyük sebebidir. Entellektüel 
patikalar, düşünsel hataların sonuçlarının ortadan kalkmaması sebebiyle düşünürleri kendisine bağımlı hale 
getirir. Hatalar ne kadar küçük olursa olsun pozitif geri bildirimler nedeniyle düşünsel patikalar, çoğu zaman, 
düşünsel patolojilere dönüşür. Bu koşullar altında, bazı hatalar düzeltilse bile, düşüncelerin genel evrimi 
mükemmellik seviyesine yakınsamaz.  
Anahtar Sözcükler: Düşünce tarihinde hatalar, entelektüel patikaya bağımlılık, entellektüel 
patolojiler, Coase Kuramı, tarihsel küçük olaylar. 
Ankara Üniversitesi 
SBF Dergisi, 
Cilt 66, No.2, 2011, s.215-233. 
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Introduction 
Darren Oldridge reports a remarkable trial that was held in Rothenbach 
in 1485 (Oldridge 2005: 1 – 19). The trial was about a woman who was 
suspected of witchcraft. The Court of Fürstenberg decided to try the woman 
with a method called “trial by red iron.” The method required the person to hold 
a piece of hot iron and carry it for three paces. The person’s hand would then be 
bound for three days. After three days, the wound would be inspected. If the 
wound was healed completely, the person would be declared innocent. But if it 
was still weeping and discolored, the person would be condemned. The trial 
ended with an impressive result. The woman took the iron from the furnace, 
walked more than three paces, and asked if she was required to walk further. 
After all that, she was acquitted and freed.  
The story tells that the woman was accused of a crime (witchcraft) that 
would seem to be “strange” to a reasonable (lawful) mind: She was set free on 
the basis of a completely arbitrary reason (i.e. passing the test of red iron). The 
cause of the strange event was cancelled out not because of some systematic 
cause (of history) and yet by another cause that was no less absurd: that she 
seemed unaffected by the red iron. Oldridge writes that such trials stopped not 
because people started to think them illogical but, rather, because the Church 
Father thought that they were against the Christian Doctrine. Such instances 
suggest to us that many absurd, strange, erroneous events could have 
conceivably existed in history, lasted for long periods, and disappeared after 
some time not because of some systematic tendency inherent in the course of 
history but, rather, by further absurdities, strangeness, and erroneousness. 
Aytuğ Yalçıntaş z On Error: Undisciplined Thought on One of the Causes of Intellectual Path Dependency z         
 
             217
Errors, and other types of irregularities alike, have always existed in 
intellectual history. Although no philosophical or scientific inquiry since the 
ancient Greeks has been separated from the reflections on error, there is not 
much space devoted to the imperfect character of human doings (i.e. capability 
of error) that is repeated for so long until we lately start to think that it had long 
been wrong. The issue here is not to argue or show whether or not errors played 
any role in the course of events in our pasts. Rather, it is to develop an answer 
to whether they had any significance, either by way of self-reproducing or self-
correcting themselves, so as to generate pathways in the life’s history. This 
essay examines whether errors are significant in the evolutionary course of 
scholarly life, and if so, why. It is argued that scholarly errors are among the 
factors that generate intellectual pathways in which consequences of historical 
small events feed back up on each other positively and give rise to historical 
pathologies in the end. Pathways hold the intellectuals dependent on the 
consequences of errors which interact upon each other and prevent resulting 
pathologies to disappear fully. As a result, ideas do not converge to a level of 
perfection. Evolutionary account of errors suggests that errors in the history of 
ideas matter even though they are often corrected. 
 
1. What Some Conventional History of Ideas 
Have Neglected 
Philosophers have long elaborated on irregularities caused by 
erroneousness in scholarly life. According to Friedrich Hegel, history was 
governed by a mechanism in which dialectics constituted the principle 
according to which history (of philosophy) progressed from contradiction to 
logic. “Dialectical philosophy,” Terry Pinkard argues (1988: 19), “explains the 
possibility of apparently incompatible categorical beliefs by trying to show that 
the apparent incompatibility is only apparent, that the contradiction is avoided 
once one expands one’s framework of discourse in the appropriate way.” 
History was self-determined to true knowledge. It ran through negativity: a 
proposition (thesis) was to be negated (that is, passed over into its opposite) by 
another proposition that was dialectically in contradiction with the former 
proposition and transformed into a new beginning (synthesis) which, in turn, 
was the thesis of a new generation of dialectical course. “What propels the 
dialectic is the emergence of new contradictions in the explanation that avoided 
the old ones, and the dialectic continues until no more contradictions emerge” 
(Pinkard, 1988: 19). This general “process of change” was the pathway from 
“abstract” to “concrete,” from “possibility” to “actuality,” from “falsehood” to 
“truth.” Upon the path, contradictions and confusions were all negated one after 
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another. Accidents and contingencies were not part of the big story. The 
“process” featured necessity. It was completely teleological. 
The only requisite for the acquisition of the Scientific progression – and 
the very simple insight into this is what essentially concerns us – is the 
cognition of the logical proposition that the negative is equally positive, 
or that that which contradicts itself does not dissolve into Zero [Null] but 
essentially only into the negation of its particular content, or that such a 
negation is not all negation but the negation of the determinate subject-
matter [Sache] which dissolves and is thus determinate negation, so that 
that from which is results is essentially contained in the result – which 
actually is a tautology, for otherwise it would be something immediate 
and not a result (Hegel Science of Logic, 1812, quoted by Rosen, 1982: 
31). 
Karl Popper’s view on critical rationalism was based on the 
understanding that errors and mistakes were an essential part of scientific 
research. According to Popper, there was no way to avoid errors in the 
explanation of the unknown but science was nevertheless capable of correcting 
them. In order for this to happen, scientific knowledge should be able to be 
falsified by further evidence and testing. Scientific activity was based on 
“negative argument,” that is, criticism and propositions that put things right (or 
better, truer). If a proposition was not criticizeable (i.e. falsifiable), it was not 
scientific. By way of criticism, more errors and mistakes in the scientific 
discourse could be singled out and we could pass on to new theories that 
featured more truth-value. What mattered was the cure – not the prevention of 
error (Miller, 1985: 9 – 14). According to Popper, critical rationalism was the 
only way for science to grow. Verification, say, couldn’t be the way of attaining 
truth because it didn’t have critical rationalist basis and it was flawed with the 
problem of induction: no matter how many times one observed an event, one 
could not provide any proof as to whether the same happening would take place 
next time. By way of falsification, Popper argued, that is, choosing theories that 
had higher empirical content or verisimilitude, one could “move forward” as 
false theories were thus eliminated from the intellectual sphere. Truth was an 
endless inquiry, requiring a critical rationalist view on new theories. (See 
Popper, 1945 and 1958 in Miller, 1985 and Keuth, 2005: 151 – 165.) 
Imre Lakatos has provided one of the most insightful reflections on the 
development of scientific knowledge since Popper’s Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (1959). Lakatos argues, too, that there is rational basis for 
progression in science. “Research programs,” according to Lakatos, are 
progressive if and when a new theorem is an attempt to discover novel facts and 
provide more precise predictions about novel facts. Growth of knowledge is not 
necessarily a matter of accepting or refuting single theorems according to a 
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scientific criterion. In other words, Popperian problem of demarcation – 
distinguishing science from pseudoscience – is not the only problem. (It is not 
even an important one.) What matters is assessment of research programs in 
which a scientific community operates with a number of very general 
hypotheses – “hard core” – in terms of their ability to provide explanation about 
new facts. The key issue here is that new theorems must help develop new 
experimental techniques and provide insights about new facts. In a progressive 
research program, theorems do not need to pass the test of falsification (or 
comply with any other abstract rule). Neither do theorems need to displace 
another theorem. The problem is to lessen the amount (or significance) of 
inconsistent observations that newly accepted theorems point at. In the 
Popperian methodology, inconsistencies would end up with abandoning the 
theorem. Abandoning a research program, however, is not necessarily the only 
option for a forward-looking scientist who is confronted with theoretical 
challenges that come about as a result of the observance of new facts. In fact, it 
is a moral duty for scientists to face negative “crucial experiments.” Solving the 
problems that crucial experiments give rise to, scientists are more able to 
achieve “problem shifts,” which eventually results in cumulative progress of 
knowledge. When negative experiments lead to more inconsistencies – or what 
Thomas Kuhn once called “anomalies” – “positive heuristic” helps scientists to 
overcome these difficulties. Positive heuristic consists of the principles 
instructing scientists the path to follow in order to get them “closer to truth.” 
Requirement for “continuous growth” in science is the following: 
There are no such things as crucial experiments, at least not if these are 
meant to be experiments which can instantly overthrow a research 
program. In fact, when one research program suffers defeat and is 
superseded by another one, we may – with long hindsight – call an 
experiment crucial if it turns out to have provided a spectacular 
corroborating instance for the victorious program and the failure for the 
defeated one … if a scientist in the “defeated” camp puts forward a few 
years later a scientific explanation of the allegedly “crucial experiment” 
within (or consistent with) the allegedly defeated programme, the 
honorific title may be withdrawn and the crucial experiment may turn 
from a defeat into a new victory for the program. (Lakatos and Musgrave, 
1970: 173, italics in the original are omitted.) 
To put it simply, both Popper and Hegel, among many others, such as 
Lakatos, supposed that big systematic forces of history, such as rationalism and 
dialectics, would eventually dominate the course of natural and social events in 
such a way that the consequences of “historical small events” (Arthur, 1989), 
usually in the form of small errors and contradictions in analysis, giving rise to 
“intellectual path dependence,” would cancel out the effects of each other. 
Historical small events existed, according to Popper and Hegel, but their role 
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was only temporal and such events could not have long-lasting causal 
influences. At best, they could be side effects which would be canceled out one 
way or the other over the course of time. (For further argumentation on 
“historical small events,” Yalçıntaş, 2009: 127 – 152.) 
 
2. From Path Dependence into Intellectual 
Pathologies 
As a matter of fact, a large number of events fit into their philosophical 
outlook. However, evolutionary theory of institutional change in general 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) and the theory of path dependence in particular 
(David, 1985; Arthur 1994; and Pierson 2000), points out a small difference, an 
appendix that should be annexed to their world-view: that is, there are such 
occasions in history that there could never be an objective reason for the 
consequences of small events to disappear so easily because specificities of 
each circumstance might have featured feedback properties which would cause 
the effects of small errors to last long and grow big. As a result, “scientific 
advancement” is often interrupted or at least forced to follow a non-linear 
pathway. As Prigogine and Stengers (1984: xxviii) maintain, “the history of 
science is far from being a linear unfolding that corresponds to a series of 
successive approximations toward some intrinsic truth. It is full of 
contradictions, of unexpected turning points.” In other words, under the 
conditions of path dependence, a system may lock itself into a number of 
evolutionary pathways in which the smoothing out of irregularities is not 
possible. In order to uncover the mechanisms that cause such results, one 
should examine every little detail. Such details are the small events, i.e. errors 
and contradictions, which historians have ignored and long considered 
irrelevant for the history of ideas. 
Path dependence research includes works about the “tangled pathways of 
history” (Collins et al., 1999), the institutional history of thinking systems 
(Graff, 1987) and “evolution of vocabularies” that have been locked in to 
specific paths (Ocasio and Joseph, 2005). John D. Sterman and Jason 
Wittenberg (1989) depart from Kuhn’s argument (2000: 104) that “small 
changes … can have large-scale effects” and claim that “self-reinforcing 
processes amplify intrinsically unobservable micro-level perturbations in the 
environment – the local conditions of science, society, and self faced by the 
creators of a new theory – until they reach macroscopic significance.” They 
develop a Kuhnian model of interacting paradigms in which the creation of new 
theories is stochastic and endogenous. According to Sterman and Wittenberg, it 
is positive feedbacks that  
create the self-organizing dynamic by which uncommitted and 
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unorganized practitioners coalesce into a highly focused paradigm with a 
productive program of normal science. Through these feedbacks a 
successful paradigm alters its environment by suppressing the creation of 
competitors and rapidly starving any that do emerge of the resources they 
would need to succeed. The same feedback processes operate in the 
opposite direction during the crises period to accelerate the collapse of a 
paradigm which has accumulated sufficient anomalies for confidence to 
begin falling. 
In a similar fashion, Albert Jolink and Jack Vromen (2001) argue that 
scientific knowledge and procedures are vulnerable to lock-in effects and 
multiple self-reinforcing mechanisms. Members of the scientific community 
use each others” results, build upon each others’ work, and seek out recognition 
and prestige among their peers. As a consequence, Jolink and Vromen remark, 
The more scientists accept the same concepts and standards, the more 
attractive it becomes for those scientists to stick to their guns and for 
others to join the bandwagon. By the same token, with the lion’s share of 
the community converging on the same concepts and standards, barriers 
to exit conventional science are erected (Jolink and Vromen, 2001). 
“In all cases, error since the seventeenth century has been understood as 
a case of pathological belief, of credit extended recklessly or lazily or slavishly” 
(Daston, 2005). Our question, likewise, is the following: are errors ignorable or 
are they among the factors that give rise to intellectual paths and pathologies? 
How do errors in analyses turn into intellectual pathologies? 
Path dependence, in general terms, is regarded as blind processes that do 
not consummate with a certain end-point. In epidemiology, blindness is usually 
considered to be a pathological situation that causes a person to lack visual 
perceptions (see the WHO Fact Sheet No 282, November 2004). In fact, blind 
processes, from a philosophical point of view, can be considered pathological, 
too, in the sense that, in nature and society, they lead to path dependent 
circumstances in which individuals practice their capability of error and 
capability to repeat it in the general course of events. 
The manner in which “the normal” and “the pathological” are 
constructed in such disciplines as medicine, psychology, and sociology is 
crucially important in uncovering the significance of historical small events and 
mechanisms related to evolution (of ideas), consequences of which dominate 
various fields of intellectual life. Pathologies in the history of medicine and 
psychology often show us the central role of historical small events, usually in 
the form of errors and contradictions, in the making of social and economic 
institutions: initial conditions (errors), self-reinforcing themselves, often turn 
into bigger occurrences (pathologies). An error is considered to be any factor 
that generates formal flaws featuring hereditary interruptions and suspensions 
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in social processes (Canguilhem, 1991: 278). Under such conditions, harm can 
be truly large and radical. Errors transform into pathologies within the relation 
between the organism and its environment. An error is now not defined as a 
simplistic phenomenon, taking place only once, with predictable results. 
Instead, it is considered to feature complexity in the sense that linear causal 
relations lead the system into non-linear states generating substantial outcomes 
randomly. 
The notion of pathologies, though, should not necessarily be imbued with 
a negative meaning or circumstance. The distinctive element in the notion of 
pathology is the positive feedback loops inherent in the evolutionary history of 
a specific epidemic. Intellectual paths in the institutional evolution of human 
ideas are pathologies in the sense that numerous self-reinforcing mechanisms 
magnify the effects of small causes in such a way that consequences of initial 
conditions are much greater for the intellectual community in the end. Whether 
the outcome is desirable or not is another issue.  
The study of intellectual paths matters because these paths help us 
explain the mechanisms which disallow thinkers to diverge from pathologies in 
history. Had there been only a single path of modern civilization or intellectual 
advancement since thinkers started to ask questions about nature and society, 
that is, if the best-of-all-possible-worlds argument were true and we lived in 
such a world, we would have never been interested in the roles that small events 
have played in the course of history. There have been many. There have been 
numerous spatial and temporal paths in history, in which particularities and 
specificities played important roles in the course of events. Irregularities come 
about in such “processes” in response to assorted variables in the direction 
indicated by the first push. Investigations into such pathologies require more 
effort than deriving abstract generalizations or doing “blackboard science.” 
In the history of economic ideas, we detect numerous instances of error 
in the ways economists analyze the phenomena they live by. Errors often cause 
the evolution of the economic literature to “change tracks.” Stanley Jevons once 
argued that “that able but wrong-headed man, David Ricardo, shunted the car of 
Economic science on to a wrong line, a line, however, on which it was further 
urged towards confusion by his equally able and wrong-headed admirer, John 
Stuart Mill” (Jevons, 1871: 45). Jevons thought that Malthus and Senior had a 
better understanding of “true doctrines.” But the influence of Ricardo and Mill 
was powerful. “It will be a work of labor,” Jevons claimed, “to pick up the 
fragments of a shattered science and to start anew.” It is a hard task, he argued, 
though a must for those who would like to see the advance of economic 
science. 
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William Coleman correctly points at the consequences of the issue. 
“Instead of moving further away (“ahead”) from the past,” he argues, 
“economic thought has sometimes moved “forward into the past” as old 
problems recur[red], and older theories live[d] again. Thus in the 1970s, slow 
growth of the UK economy promoted Roger Bacon and Walter Eltis to advance 
classical growth like diagnoses of this sluggishness: too few producers. 
Similarly, the war between post-Keynesians and Monetarists in the same period 
was reminiscent of the 1840s controversy between the Banking School and the 
Currency School” (Coleman 2005). Likewise, the South Sea Bubble was 
repeated when Wall Street crashed in 1929. Families were torn apart at the 
time. People turned into beggars (Mackay, 1995: 46-88; Colbert, 2001: 13-14). 
Alchemists and fortunetellers are still alive at present. They keep 
occupied the minds of many people who read astrology magazines. We have so 
long forgotten the business of witchcraft, but witchcraft remains (at least 
conceptually) in our daily lives. Charles Mackay’s Extraordinary Popular 
Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1852) focuses on manias, follies, and 
delusions in human history. He covers such issues as “The South-Sea Bubble,” 
“The Witch Mania,” and “The Slow Poisoners,” about which he wrote in 1852: 
“We find that whole communities suddenly fix their minds upon one object, 
and go mad in its pursuit; that millions of people become simultaneously 
impressed with one delusion, and run after it, till their attention is caught by 
some new folly more captivating than the first” (Mackay, 1852: xv). Many have 
not noticed the stories of madness in the past, but we live by the consequences 
of idiocy, insanity, and irony such as those that Mackay mentions in his book. 
And finally, Matthias van Boxsel (2004) provides numerous examples of 
ironies in history. He argues that stupidity is the foundation of our civilization. 
The best way to get rid of the terrible feeling after a stupid act, according to 
Boxsel, is to repeat it. This turns stupidity into a joke and makes it funny. Thus, 
stupidity turns into a conscious act. It is institutionalized and has become a 
condition for intelligence. 
 
3. Types of Error 
It is possible to elaborate on the term “error” in a number of various 
ways. According to Aristotle, Canguilhem argues, a monster could be an error 
because it intervened unfavorably in the ways in which plants and animals 
behaved so as to achieve harmony in nature. Error could be attributed to an 
objective criterion, too. For a calculator, it is a substantial error to calculate 9 as 
the square root of 64. Some errors are not harmful such as (some of) those 
made by children (Gigerenzer, 2005). When a child who has just started to 
speak uses “gived” instead of “gave” she is usually recognized as following a 
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normal and necessary developmental path. Such errors are “good errors.” 
Sometimes, experts make good errors as well. “After the invention of the 
telephone,” Gerd Gigerenzer reports, “a group of British experts concluded that 
this invention had no practical value, at least in their country: The telephone 
may be appropriate for our American cousins, but not here, because we have an 
adequate supply of messenger boys” (Gigerenzer, 2005). 
We can choose from a multitude of examples from history to illustrate 
this point. For instance, blackness (the so-called Negro Problem) or 
homosexuality have for a long time been (and even still are by some) regarded 
as (neurotic) pathologies. What must strike the inquirer here is that cultural 
factors influence the way biological and mental pathologies are defined. The 
opposite is also true: how we define pathology influences the way the culture is 
constructed. In other words, there is a feedback relation between the two. Under 
such conditions, pathologies re-express and re-constitute the values of the 
society in which those pathologies are defined. In the case of homosexuality, 
social culture’s horror of homosexuality has given rise to the efforts to “cure” 
the condition. All homosexuals were thought to have a common 
dysfunctioning. Such “pathology” caused societies to see it as the root of a 
number of problems, such as cultural degeneration. And this has made the 
examination of the pathology a more critical issue. A number of serious 
measures were taken in the social and cultural sphere. This intensified society’s 
horror of sexuality and the circular logic was thus constructed. 
Another illustrative example of this phenomenon is the case of defining 
Blackness as pathology. The result was the widespread sharing of a descriptive 
norm as a social norm. Benjamin Rush (1785), although a strong ally of the 
black-skinned population in America in the eighteenth century, claimed to have 
discovered a pathology that he called “negroism” or “negritude,” which, Lawrie 
Reznek reports, was a mild form of congenital leprosy whose only symptom 
was the darkness of the skin (Reznek, 1987: 18). Rush argued that being a 
“negro” or black was a hereditary pathology. Whites shouldn’t intermarry with 
the blacks, Rush declared, as it “would infect posterity with the ‘disorder’.” 
In a similar fashion, Samuel Cartwright (1851) named two diseases 
peculiar to black-skinned peoples – “drapetomania” and “rascality.” 
Drapetomania was a disease causing the slaves to run away. And dysaesthesia 
aethiopica was a disease that caused rascality, writes Cartwright, 
peculiar to negroes, affecting both mind and body in a manner as well 
expressed by dysaesthesia, the name I have given it, as could be by a 
single term. There is both mind and sensibility, but both seem to be 
difficult to reach by impressions from without. There is a partial 
insensibility of the skin, and so great a hebetude of the intellectual 
faculties, as to be like a person half asleep, that is with difficulty aroused 
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and kept awake. It differs from every other species of mental disease, as it 
is accompanied with physical signs or lesions of the body discoverable to 
the medical observer, which is always present and sufficient to account 
for the symptoms. It is much more prevalent among free Negroes living 
in clusters by themselves, than among slaves on our plantations, and 
attacks only such slaves as live like free Negroes in regard to diet, drinks, 
exercise, etc. 
When pathologies are at stake, “cumulative causation” operates in 
disfavor of numerous disenfranchised and minority groups. Cumulative 
causation, in the works of such writers as Thorstein Veblen (Veblen 1898 and 
1961), Gunnar Myrdal (1997), and others, accounts for how the final effects of 
greater magnitude can come into existence as causes of the initial efforts. (For a 
general account of cumulative causation see Toner 1999.) In such causal 
mechanisms, components and variables respond to a change of any cause in the 
same direction with a follow-up effect upon the first components and variables. 
The causal system is dynamic in the sense that the system moves as a 
consequence of the cumulative effects of initial and consecutive pushes as well 
as the interaction between them. Variables are causally interconnected, leaving 
no place for the “first cause”; “everything is cause to everything else” so that 
the system is interlocked. Myrdal assumes interdependence between all the 
factors in “the Negro Problem.” 
White prejudice and discrimination keep the Negro low in standards of 
living, health, education, manners and morals. This, in its turn, gives 
support to white prejudice. White prejudice and Negro standards thus 
mutually “cause” each other. If things remain about as they are and have 
been, this means that the two forces happen to balance each other. Such a 
static “accommodation” is, however, entirely accidental. If either of the 
factors changes, this will cause a change in the other factor, too, and start 
a process of interaction where the change in one factor will continuously 
be supported by the reaction of the other factor. The whole system will be 
moving in the direction of the primary change, but much further. This is 
what we mean by cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1997: 76). 
Gladwell (2000) makes a similar analogy and likens the spread of social 
behavioral patterns to the epidemics of contagious diseases. Ideas diffuse 
among different social circles, Gladwell argues, just like viruses do. Epidemics 
“tip” – that is, the spread of virus reaches critical mass and its graph shoots 
straight upwards. This happens very rapidly because the virus carriers are (or at 
least can be) socialized into different groups among which there are powerful 
ties. In the 1990s it was thought that crack cocaine was the cause of the spread 
of HIV in New York because it led to risky sexual behavior. “It brings far more 
people into poor areas to buy drugs,” Gladwell reports, “which then increases 
the likelihood that they will take an infection home with them to their own 
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neighborhood. It changes the patterns of social connections between 
neighborhoods” (Gladwell, 2000: 15). Social and intellectual pathologies (or 
epidemics) work in the same way. The emergence of fashion trends, the ebb 
and flow of crime rates, and the phenomena of word of mouth are examples in 
which a social pattern crosses a threshold and its expansion takes the form of 
“exponential overdrive” (Gladwell, 2000: 7). This may seem like a strange 
thought, Gladwell claims, because we are intellectually born into a conception 
of approximation among causes and consequences. Changes we render in social 
life take place steadily and slowly. “We are trained to think that what goes into 
any transaction or relationship or system must be directly related, in intensity 
and dimension, to what comes out” (Gladwell, 2000: 11). This is not 
necessarily the case “in the real world.” Consequences are often far out of 
proportion to initial causes when evolution takes the form of “geometrical 
progression.” Under such conditions, what matters are little things, like small 
events.  
Crime is always considered to be a consequence of social injustice, 
structural economic inequities, unemployment, racism, and so forth and so on. 
If policy makers want to reduce the crime rate, they have to solve the big social 
problems; they have to deal with big causes. Indeed, this was what the New 
York Police Department and many criminologists had said was done in the 
1990s when the crime rate in New York fell more than 60 percent within a 
decade. Policing strategies improved noticeably, they claimed. The crack trade 
was stopped. Employment opportunities increased.  
Such changes are certainly important in increasing the quality of life of a 
community – but only in the long run. As a matter of fact, New York’s 
economy didn’t improve significantly between 1980 and 1990. Crack cocaine 
was an influential factor in the increase of crime rates, Gladwell reports, but it 
had already been in steady decline by the time the crime rate dipped. The 
reason why the crime rates declined in New York was more complicated. Big 
social factors couldn’t account for why the rates did not fall so sharply in other 
cities that implemented the same social policies and why it took place in such a 
short time only in New York.  
Gladwell argues that the “broken window theory” of two criminologists, 
James Wilson and George Kelling, provides the best explanation. “If a window 
is broken and left unrepaired,” writes Gladwell, “people walking by will 
conclude that no one cares and no one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be 
broken and the sense of anarchy will spread from the building to the street on 
which it faces, sending a signal that anything goes” (Gladwell, 2000: 141). This 
is an epidemic theory of crime, saying that crime is contagious and it can start 
with a broken window and spread to the whole community. Gladwell shows 
that the problem in New York was solved by way of changing specific and 
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relatively small elements that served as tipping points. The authorities decided 
to remove all the graffitis in the subway system. This would show New 
Yorkers, authorities thought, that they were taking the problem seriously. The 
graffiti problem was considered the symbol of the collapse of the system. The 
authorities considered that at the heart of the problem laid the winning of the 
battle against graffiti in the trains. And just as they thought, such minor changes 
had dramatic effects on how people behaved. Authorities fixed the broken 
windows, cleaned up the graffiti, and removed any other signals in public 
places that would invite people to commit crime. The crime rate fell 
dramatically. After the tipping point people started to behave differently. The 
New York subway experiment showed, according to Gladwell, that it was 
“possible to be a better person on a clean street or in a clean subway than in one 
littered with trash and graffiti” (Gladwell, 2000: 168). 
Epidemics are, at the root, about this very process of transformation. 
When we are trying to make an idea or attitude or product tip, we’re 
trying to change our audience in some small yet critical respect: we’re 
trying to infect them, sweep them up in our epidemic, convert them from 
hostility to acceptance. That can be done through the influence of special 
kinds of people, people of extraordinary personal connection … It can be 
done by changing the content of communication, by making a message so 
memorable that it sticks in someone’s mind and compels them to action 
… [S]mall changes in context can be just as important in tipping 
epidemics, even though that fact appears to violate some of our most 
deeply held assumptions about human nature (Gladwell, 2000: 166). 
Many errors in the history of human ideas are usually trivial or self-
corrective. Such “errors” do not always cause intellectual pathologies. Jevons, 
for instance, thought there was a connection between sunspots and business 
cycles, but it was soon corrected. “The Earth [was] at rest,” Ptolemy thought, 
“it [was] in the centre of the Universe, and that fixed stars move[d] together as 
a sphere” (Field, 1981: 349). His astronomy was wrong but it nevertheless 
worked well and helped navigators produce land and sea maps using 
measurement and observatory techniques. It was then corrected, too. Sungook 
Hong reports that Guglielmo Marconi’s invention of the transmission of 
wireless signals across the Atlantic Ocean was based upon a small error. We 
now know that he was wrong (Hong, 2005). 
While some errors in history are harmless or even temporarily fruitful, 
others generate enduring paths of evolution. Many errors in history are either 
left uncorrected or their significant consequences linger on through time 
(although, occasionally, at decreasing scales). In such cases, we keep repeating 
the same errors. Uncorrected errors of the past sometimes generate 
disappointments about concrete situations in the future. Life then starts to get 
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more complicated and more tragic. Kenneth Prewitt (2005) argues that there are 
many instances in the history of social science “truths” that have lasted for 
centuries without being touched upon. The example he gives is a “mistake 
whose origin is to be found in the assumptions, preferences, and prejudices 
brought to the research question” (Prewitt 2005). Samuel George Morton, a 
nineteenth century anthropologist and zoologist, Prewitt reports, thought to 
have proved a hierarchy of races in which Caucasians were blessed with the 
most capacious array of skills and Negros as well as a number of aboriginal 
groups with the smallest. Morton’s categorization was used to formulate the 
1850 census that was introduced to determine whether or not the cross-race 
reproduction caused mentally defective offspring. Merton’s “race science” – as 
well as Herbert Spancer’s survival-of-the-fittest argument – resulted in many 
unhappy stories in the United States and Europe in the twentieth and, even, 
twenty-first centuries. “The social science mistake was an elementary one,” 
writes Prewitt, “[a]s noted by Stephan Jay Gould, it was ‘the claim that worth 
can be assigned to individuals and groups by measuring intelligence as a single 
quantity’ (Gould 1981)” (Prewitt, 2005). 
Our issue is how to characterize this social mistake. It is obvious that 
neither the formulation of race-science nor its subsequent rejection can be 
understood solely in scientific terms – that is, by simply considering 
hypotheses, data, theory construction, better data, new hypotheses, theory 
modification, ad infinitum. Both its formulation and its rejection have to 
be understood as part of a larger political project: its formulation on 
behalf of defending slavery and sustaining racial separation; its rejection 
on behalf of educational programs to discredit racist thinking and 
government policies to compensate for past racial injustice. In this 
example, the inseparability of a social science theory and its political uses 
indicated how a science project and a political project were unfolding in 
tandem, resulting in a social science “mistake” (Prewitt, 2005). 
Such examples suggest that some errors are significant but nevertheless 
temporal. That is, the consequences of errors sometimes fade away in time, 
causing less and less damage as time goes by. Some other errors, however, take 
more time for the intellectuals to realize that they have basically been locked 
into a pathway that was inaccurate. Such errors are reinforced by further errors 
and they linger on and on. The consequences are copied by themselves multiple 
times. In such occasions, errors are difficult to cope with. They generate 
significant intellectual pathologies in history.  
An example of this is statistical significance tests in economics. Steve 
Ziliak and Deirdre McCloskey report that of the 182 papers published in 
American Economic Review during the 1980s, 70 percent did not distinguish 
statistical significance from economic significance and 96 percent misused 
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statistical significance tests (Ziliak and McCloskey, 1996). Ziliak and 
McCloskey have conducted the same survey for the empirical papers of the 
next decade, and concluded that the case had not improved. Economists have, 
since the 1980s, not ceased in making the same error. “Of the 137 relevant 
papers in the 1990s,” write Ziliak and McCloskey (2004), “82 percent mistook 
statistically significant coefficients for economically significant coefficients (as 
compared to 70 percent in the earlier decade). In the 1980s, 53 percent had 
relied exclusively on statistical significance as a criterion of importance at its 
first use; in the 1990s, 64 percent did.” The statistical significance tests are one 
of the examples of important intellectual paths in our scholarly life of 
economics for which setting a new path in motion has long been impossible: 
The current practice statistical significance represents a market failure in 
the sense that the market for published and refereed articles has failed to 
drive out a substandard product: the use of tests statistical significance for 
wrong (unscientific) reasons. Moreover, the persistence of this sub-
optimal practice is path dependent, a product of the type of market which 
exists for journal articles and the economic and psychological costs of 
producing the product. The current structure of incentives is such that one 
cannot expect that the current wrong practices will be easily abandoned 
or significantly modified. We are locked in to a path of empirical practice 
which yields unscientific results with regards to analytical significance 
(Altman, 2004). 
The “Coase Theorem” should be interpreted in the same vein. An error in 
the history of the “theorem” has turned into an intellectual pathology. In fact, 
Stigler’s (mis-)representation of Coase’s contribution could have been 
corrected long ago, but the “theorem” remained as Stigler introduced it in 
Stigler (1966) because the economics of this particular case has prevented 
correction from happening. Retesting the original contribution would have 
changed the fate of the “Coase Theorem” long ago but economists have failed 
to replicate the original results of Ronald Coase in 1960 and onwards because 
running experiments about the validity of past findings requires time and this 
has been the scarcest “commodity” for university researchers. The 
“contribution” of Stigler to Coase (1960), too small a cause in relation to its 
consequence, should be seen as an interruption in the systematic evolution of 
the “theorem.” Even if some attempts towards correction had taken place, 
evolution may have been further disturbed and caused to follow additional 
numbers of diverse pathways. (For further argumentation on the “Coase 
Theorem”: Yalçıntaş, 2010.) 
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Conclusion 
One of the main reasons why intellectuals are hold dependent on several 
evolutionary pathways is that intellectuals develop habits of thought according 
to which they think, behave, and act. Think of it twice: Many of us like reading 
newspapers on Sunday mornings. We use words from a specific, limited 
vocabulary of pet names to address our lovers. And, historians of ideas use 
specific sets of metaphors to explain the evolution of the phenomenon that they 
are interested in. Certainly, historians’ use of specific sets of metaphors is not 
necessarily because they do not know any others. It is rather because they are 
used to doing science with those words. A good reader of Nietzsche would 
immediately guess which text might belong to him because Nietzsche had 
chosen a specific set of words to explain philosophy. It is the same in the music 
of The Beatles and the paintings of Johannes Vermeer. An intellectual path 
dependency worldview suggests that we are not really entitled to begin talking 
about intellectual and practical problems in the terms that we are accustomed 
to, especially when we are more knowledgeable than past generations about the 
shortcomings and imperfections of the constructions that we continue to 
construct. Historians of economics are within the same circle: we do not need a 
depiction of economics expressed in the terms (and the ideology) introduced 
by, say, Utopia (Yalçıntaş, 2006). We do not need one theory of economics 
providing us with solutions to all the worldly problems of human societies that 
have existed in history and all around the globe. There should also have been no 
presumption that corrections in the history of economics would cure all the 
imperfections in and of the past (thus irreversibility). In other words, markets 
would often fail to fully reverse the consequences of errors because of a 
complex set of reasons. We should underline the fact that errors and 
corrections, considered together, are two of the non-eliminable constituents of 
the evolutionary history of scholarly institutions. The relationship between the 
two is complex: they interact upon each other and they generate further 
irreversible and unpredictable outcomes. For instance, the history of the “Coase 
Theorem” requires historians of scholarly economics to pay special attention to 
this case. Stigler and other authors, pointing at the error in its history, (Coase, 
1991; McCloskey, 1998; Buttler and Garnett, 2003) have already caused 
several irreversible consequences in its evolution. Historians of economics 
should not report such authors as magicians touching upon simple wounds and 
curing them away fully. In other words, the “Coase Theorem” won’t be 
destined toward a (fictive) stage of perfection even after various contributions 
correct the error and delete the negative effect of Stigler on Coase (1960). 
Historians of ideas should record Stigler as an important figure who played 
significant roles in the formulization and popularization of Coase’s contribution 
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of the 1960s. Stigler is the one who has caused numerous irreversible 
consequences for the economic science.  
Mark Blaug (1979: ix) states that “but equally obviously, it must be 
insisted, great chunks of the history of economic thought are about mistakes in 
logic and gaps in analysis … [mistakes which were] propelled forward by the 
desire to refine, to improve, to perfect.” What if intellectual history has been 
full of errors? For many historians, this is quite “normal” because error in the 
making of civilizations is merely a result of the imperfect nature of human 
understanding. For them, errors are sooner or later corrected; more important 
than errors are corrections. However, the path dependent evolution of 
institutions suggests that self-correction processes are often complex and that 
there is no guarantee that corrections would waive all of the irreversible effects 
of the past with a finger snap. In other words, every error amounts to a 
compromise (small or big) in the continuity of history where the success of 
social and intellectual projects relies on uninterrupted maintenance of ongoing 
scholarly conversation and empirical back-ups in old theories. When errors do 
not disappear easily and without causing further trouble, they make a long 
lasting idea in history impossible – the idea that perfection in the world of 
scholars is achievable. 
 
 
References 
Altman, M. (2004), “Statistical Significance, Path Dependency, and the Culture of Journal 
Publication,” Journal of Socio-Economics, 33 (5): 651 – 663. 
Arthur, B. (1989), “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events,” 
Economic Journal, 99 (394): 116 – 131. 
Arthur, B. (1994), Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Michigan: University 
of Michigan Press). 
Buttler, M. R. and R. F. Garnett. (2003), “Teaching the Coase Theorem: Are We Getting it Right?” 
Atlantic Economic Journal, 31 (2): 133 – 145. 
Canguilhem, G. (1991), The Normal and the Pathological (New York: Zone Books). 
Cartwright, S. (1851), “Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race,” De Bow’s Review, Southern 
and Western States, 11. 
Coase, R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1 – 44. 
Coase, R. (1991), “Contracts and the Activities of Firms,” Journal of Law and Economics, 34 (2): 
451 – 452. 
Colbert, D. (2001), Eyewitnesses to Wall Street (New York: Broadway Books). 
Coleman, W. (2005), “Taking out the Pins: Economics as Alive and Living in the History of 
Economic Thought,” Economic Papers, 24 (2): 107 – 115. 
    z Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi z 66-2 
 
232
Collins, R., R. A. Hanneman, and G. Mordt. (1999), “How Stimulating a Compact Theory Can 
Reproduce the Tangled Pathways of History” In: R. Collins. (ed.) Macrohistory: Essays 
in Sociology of the Long Run (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press): 239 – 
259. 
Daston, L. (2005), “Scientific Error and the Ethos of Belief,” Social Research, 72 (1): 1 – 28. 
David, P. (1985), “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic Review, 75 (2): 332 – 
337. 
Field, J. V. 1981, “Ptolemaic Astronomy” In: B. Bynum and Porter. (eds.) Dictionary of the 
History of Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Gigerenzer, G. (2005), “I Think, Therefore I Err,” Social Research, 72 (1): 1 – 24. 
Gladwell, M. (2000), Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (London: 
Abacus). 
Graff, G. (1987), Professing Literature: An Institutional History (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press). 
Hong, S. (2005), “Marconi’s Error: The First Transatlantic Wireless Telegraphy in 1901,” Social 
Research, 72 (1): 107 – 124. 
Jevons, S. (1871), The Theory of Political Economy. 3rd Edition. (New York: Macmillan). 
Jolink, A. and J. Vromen. (2001), “Path Dependence in Scientific Evolution” In Garrouste and 
Ioannides. (eds.) Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing): 205 – 224. 
Keuth, H. (2005), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Kuhn, T. (2000), The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an 
Autobiographical Interview (Chicago: Chicago University Press). 
Lakatos, I. and A. Musgrave. (1970) (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Mackay, C. (1852 [1995]), Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (Three 
Rivers Press). 
McCloskey, D. (1998), “Good Old Coase Theorem and the Good Old Chicago School: A Comment 
on Zerbe and Medema,” In: S. G. Medema (ed.) Coasean Economics: Law and 
Economics and the New Institutional Economics (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers): 239 – 248. 
Miller, D. W. (1985) (ed.), Popper Selections (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Myrdal, G. (1997), An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, (New 
Jersey: Harper and Row Publishers). 
Nelson, R. R. and Winter S. G. (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press). 
Ocasio, W. and J. Joseph. (2005), “Cultural Adaptation and Institutional Change: The Evolution of 
Vocabularies of Corporate Governance, 1972 – 2003,” Poetics, 33 (3 – 4): 163 – 178. 
Oldridge, D. (2005), Strange Histories: The Trial of the Pig, the Walking Dead, and Other Matters 
of Fact from the Medieval and Renaissance World (London: Routledge). 
Aytuğ Yalçıntaş z On Error: Undisciplined Thought on One of the Causes of Intellectual Path Dependency z         
 
             233
Pierson, P. (2000), “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American 
Political Science Review, 94 (2): 251 – 267. 
Pinkard, T. (1988), Hegel’s Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press). 
Popper, K. (1945), “The Defense of Rationalism,” In: D. Miller. (ed.) Popper Selections 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press): 357 – 365. 
Popper, K. (1958), “The Beginnings of Rationalism” In: D. Miller. (ed.) Popper Selections 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press): 25 – 32. 
Prewitt, K. (2005), “The Two Projects of the American Social Sciences,” Social Research, 72 (1): 
219 – 236. 
Prigogine, I. and I. Stengers. (1984), Order out of Chaos: Men’s New Dialogue with Nature (New 
York: Bentam Books). 
Reznek, L. (1987), The Nature of Disease (London: Routledge). 
Rosen, M. (1982), Hegel’s Dialectic and Its Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Rush, B. (1785), An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits upon the Body and Mind. 
Sterman, J. D. and J. Wittenberg. (1999), “Path Dependence, Competition, and Succession in the 
Dynamics of Scientific Revolutions,” Organization Science, 10 (3): 322 – 241. 
Stigler, G. J. (1952 [1966]), The Theory of Price. 3rd Edition. (New York: The Macmillan Co.). 
Toner, P. (1999), Main Currents in Cumulative Causation (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.). 
Van Boxsel, M. (2004), Encyclopedia of Stupidity (Reaktion Books). 
Veblen, T. (1898), “Why Economics is not an Evolutionary Science,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 12 (4): 373 – 394. 
Veblen, T. (1961), The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (New York: Russell & Russell). 
Yalçıntaş, A. (2006). “Historical Small Events and the Eclipse of Utopia: Perspectives on Path 
Dependence in Human Thought” Culture, Theory and Critique, 47 (1): 53 – 70. 
Yalçıntaş, A. (2009). Intellectual Paths and Pathologies: How Small Events in Scholarly Life 
Accidentally Grow Big. (Published PhD Dissertation. Erasmus University Rotterdam). 
Yalçıntaş, A. (2010). “The ‘Coase Theorem’ vs. Coase Theorem Proper: How an Error Emerged 
and Why It Remained Uncorrected So Long” Paper Presented at the European Society 
for the History of Economic Thought Annual Conference in Amsterdam 2010 and the 
History of Economic Society Annual Conference in Syracuse, NY 2010. Available online 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628163 [Accessed in April 2011]. 
Ziliak, S. and D. McCloskey. (1996), “Standard Error of Regression,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, 34: 97 – 114. 
Ziliak, S. and D. McCloskey. (2004), “Size Matters: The Standard Error of Regression in the 
American Economic Review,” Journal of Socio-economics, 33 (5): 527 – 546. 
 
